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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
political liberty and personal freedom, I cannot agree that a state
may make that rule a part of its law and binding on citizens,
despite the Constitution of the United States. 0
T.F. LYSAUGHT
WITNESSES-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-FEDERAL OFFI-
CIALS BARRED FROM USING TESTIMONY ELICITED UNDER STATE IMMUNITY
STATUTE-The United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 Sup. Ct.
1594 (1964), was confronted with the problem of whether a state could
compel a witness, who had been given immunity from prosecution under its
laws, to give testimony which might be used to convict him of a federal
crime. The Court overruled its prior decisions' by holding that compelled
testimony and its fruits, elicited under a state immunity statute, may not be
used in any manner by federal officials in a criminal prosecution against the
witness.
This case must be considered in conjunction with the case of Malloy v.
Hogan,2 decided the same day, which held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was fully applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment "due process clause" and that the state
standard must be the same as the federal standard in determining whether
a witness is justified in refusing to answer on the grounds that it might tend
to incriminate him.
In the Murphys case, the petitioners were subpoenaed by the Water-
front Commission of New York Harbor to testify in regard to a work
stoppage at certain piers located in New Jersey. The petitioners were
80 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 126-27, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 31 (1908).
1 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 Sup. Ct. 63 (1941); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487, 64 Sup. Ct. 1082 (1944); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 78 Sup.
Ct. 1302 (1958).
2 378 U.S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964). Malloy had been arrested for the crime of pool
selling, and after pleading guilty had served 90 days in jail. Sixteen months after his plea
of guilty, he was subpoenaed to testify at an inquiry into alleged gambling and other
criminal activities in Hartford County, Connecticut. Malloy refused to answer questions
designed to ascertain for whom he worked when arrested for pool selling. The Con-
necticut Supreme Court of Errors had held that the Fifth Amendment was not applicable
to the States and that Malloy was not justified in refusing to answer because of the
defenses of double jeopardy and the running of the one year statute of limitations on
misdemeanors (pool selling), so that his answers could not possibly subject him to prose-
cution under any state law. Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744 (1963). The
United States Supreme Court reversed holding that Malloy could invoke the Fifth
Amendment in a state proceeding and refuse to answer because to answer might subject
him to federal prosecution and that the disclosure of the name of the man for whom
he worked might furnish a link in a chain of evidence which might connect him with
a more recent crime for which he might be prosecuted.
3 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 Sup. Ct.
1594 (1964).
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granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New York and New
Jersey. However, they still refused to answer certain questions on the
grounds that their answers might tend to incriminate them under federal
law. The immunity granted by the Commission did not purport to extend
to federal crimes. The petitioners were held in contempt for their refusal
to answer and the state courts of New Jersey upheld the contempt con-
victions on the ground that a witness may constitutionally be compelled to
give testimony, even though such testimony might be used against him in
a federal prosecution. 4 On petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the state court's judgment of contempt, but upheld the state
court's ruling that petitioners may be compelled to answer because such
compelled testimony, obtained by grant of immunity from prosecution
under state law, could not constitutionally be used to prosecute them under
federal law.
One of the most firmly established common law principles is that a
witness may refuse to answer any question which may tend to incriminate
him. The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution states that no
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." Most state constitutions contain a similar provision. Courts do
have the inherent power to compel the attendance and testimony of wit-
nesses regarding any relevant facts of a case pending before them, subject of
course to certain privileges, one of which is the privilege against self-in-
crimination. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
a declaration of the framers' abhorrence to the Inquisition and Star Cham-
ber proceedings which were resorted to in Europe and England in early
times. Although it is recognized that an occasional guilty man may go free,
this result is thought to be a lesser evil than allowing the prosecution to
build a criminal case by use of the accused's compelled disclosures. 5
The privilege against self-incrimination protects a citizen from being
compelled to furnish testimony which would tend to subject him to crimi-
nal prosecution and punishment, penalty, or forfeiture of property. Gener-
ally, the penalty must be for a public wrong, as distinguished from a private
wrong (such as treble damages for a patent infringement), in order for the
privilege against self-incrimination to avail. 6 The privilege prevents compel-
ling a person to take the stand in any criminal, quasi-criminal, or penal
proceeding, whereas in a civil proceeding a witness may not refuse to take
the stand. However, once on the stand he may refuse to answer questions
which might tend to subject him to criminal responsibility.7
The witness' privilege of refusing to testify by invoking the Fifth
Amendment is strictly personal and may not be claimed by anyone other
4 Application of Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 39 N.J. 436, 189 A.2d
36 (1963).
5 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 76 Sup. Ct. 777 (1956).
6 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses 43 (1948).
7 Id. § 45.
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than the witness himself,8 but may be waived by the witness by volunteering
the testimony. Generally, a witness having once opened the door by narrat-
ing on direct examination a portion of a transaction, may not thereafter
refuse on cross-examination to give the details on the grounds that it may
incriminate him.9 To allow the witness to give only his side of the story and
not permit his testimony to be impeached on cross-examination, violates
the principles of our adversary system of justice. In order for an individual
to invoke the privilege and refuse to answer questions on the ground that
such answers might tend to incriminate him,
• .. the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable,
with reference to the ordinary course of things,-not a danger of
an imaginary and unsubstantial character .... 10
The first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be a
limitation upon the Federal Government only, although some of the
personal rights may also be protected against state action. To refuse to
protect these personal rights in a state action would be a denial of "due
process of law," which is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.1
However, the Fifth Amendment has, until Malloy v. Hogan,12 consistently
been held not to be a limitation upon the states. The Malloy case now holds
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable
in a state action through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The five-to-four decision in the Malloy case is in line with the
Supreme Court's other recent decisions extending the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment to include personal rights contained within the first
eight Amendments.'8 After holding that the same standard must be used in
either a federal or a state court in determining whether an accused's silence
is justified, the Court quoted from Hoffman v. United States,'4 which elabo-
rated on the federal standard, as follows:
"The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in
themselves support a conviction ...but likewise embraces those
which furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute
. .. if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to
prove the hazard .. . he would be compelled to surrender the
very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To
sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications
of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive
s Id. § 48.
9 Id. § 95 (1964 Supplement).
10 Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365, 37 Sup. Ct. 631, 626 (1917) quoting from
Reg. v. Boyes, 1 Best & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861).
11 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908).
12 378 U.S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964).
13 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684 (1961) held that the Fourth
Amendment (search and seizure) provisions are fully applicable to the States; Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963) held that the Sixth Amendment (right
to counsel) is a "fundamental right, essential to a fair trial" in state criminal prosecu-
tions, as well as in federal cases.
14 341 U.S. 479, 71 Sup. Ct. 814 (1951).
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answer to the question or an explanation of why it can not be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could
result." We also said that, in applying that test, the judge must be
"'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circum-
stances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the
answer[s] can not possibly have such tendency' to incriminate."' 5
The constitutional provision permitting a witness to refuse to give evidence
which may tend to incriminate him is inapplicable if the witness is not in
danger of conviction. Therefore, if a legislature grants immunity from prose-
cution to a witness, which is in fact coextensive with the protection
afforded by the Constitution, incriminatory testimony may be compelled.' 6
However, the immunity applies only to past offenses and the witness may
be prosecuted for perjury committed while testifying under a grant of im-
munity.17 In order for an immunity statute to be valid, it must protect the
witness from prosecution, penalty, or forfeiture arising out of his testimony,
but need not protect him from personal disgrace or social penalties.'
8
After reviewing the policies of the privilege and most of the relevant
prior English and American cases, Justice Goldberg stated, in the majority
opinion of the present case:
. . . [T]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination pro-
tects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as
state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as
well as federal law.19
The court then pointed out the holding in the case of Counselman v.
Hitchcock20 that immunity legislation must be as broad in scope and effect
as the constitutional privilege in order to replace it. Therefore, since the
court had already held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination was fully applicable to the States and that the federal stand-
ard must be used in a state proceeding in determining whether the witness'
refusal to answer is justified, it held the constitutional rule to be:
[A] state witness may not be conpelled (sic) to give testimony
which may be incriminating under federal law unless the com-
pelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by
federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against
him. We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement this con-
stitutional rule and accommodate the interests of the State and
Federal Government must be prohibited from making any use of
compelled testimony and its fruits.2
1
15 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964) quoting from Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, at 486-487, 488, 71 Sup. Ct. 814, at 818, 819 (1951).
16 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195 (1895); McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 45 Sup. Ct. 16 (1924).
17 Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 32 Sup. Ct. 71 (1911).
18 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644 (1896). Contra: United States v.
James, 60 Fed. 257 (N.D. Ill. 1894).
19 378 U.S. 52,-, 84 Sup. Ct. 1594, 1609 (1964).
20 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195 (1891).
21 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, -, 84 Sup. Ct.
1594, 1609 (1964).
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It seems quite clear from the majority decision that the Court intended
to establish a constitutional rule that immunity from prosecution in one
jurisdiction must extend to another jurisdiction in order to compel incrim-
inatory testimony. Although there were no dissents in the Murphy case,
four Justices-White, Stewart, Harlan and Clark, all of whom dissented
from the decision in the Malloy case, which extended the Fifth Amendment
to the States-wrote or joined in concurring decisions in Murphy which
would limit the requirement of granting immunity from prosecution in
another jurisdiction. For instance, Justice Harlan stated that the rule
preventing federal officials from using incriminating testimony compelled
in a state proceeding, should be enforced by excluding such testimony or
its fruits by exercising the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the
federal courts, and not as a constitutional rule.
Congress has passed legislation which extends to a witness in a federal
proceeding immunity from prosecution, both as to federal and state crimes.
State immunity statutes, however, have never extended immunity from
federal crimes because to do so would probably violate the "supremacy
clause" of Article VI of the Constitution.2 2 However, the cases of Counsel-
man,23 which requires the immunity to be coextensive with the constitu-
tional provision it replaces; Malloy,24 which makes the Fifth Amendment
applicable to the States and the state and federal standard the same;
together with Murphy,25 which holds that a state witness may not be com-
pelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law
unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any
manner; would seem to require that state immunity statutes be extended to
protect the witness from federal prosecution. At the very least, the rule
established in Murphy requires that the Federal Government establish that
it had an independent source of evidence upon which to prosecute, should
there have been a prior state inquiry in which the witness was compelled
to give incriminatory testimony in return for a grant of immunity.
THOMAS C. RYDELL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS OF LAW-STATUTE DENYING
PASSPORTS TO ALL COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE-In the recent case of Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84
Sup. Ct. 1659 (1964), the Supreme Court of the United States was faced for
the first time with a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 6 of the
22 The authority of state laws or their administration may not interfere with the
carrying out of a national purpose, and where enforcement of a state law would handicap
efforts to carry out the plans of the United States, the state enactment must give way.
United States v. Mayo, 47 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Fla. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 441, 63 Sup. Ct.
1137 (1943).
23 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195 (1891).
24 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964).
25 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, supra note 25.
